Westerners-when they give attentian to the bitter struggle raging in Afghanistan-commonly characterize it as "Russia's Vietnam."ı The characterization carries with it same misleading intellectual baggage, stuff damaged in transit during America's defeat in Vietnam: the thesis that the use of military force in the Third World by a superpower inevitably runs counter to its own interests. Currently the apparent stalemate between Soviet forces and the mujahedeen offers the most convincing proof for this thesis; however, soothsayers run high risks of error by basing their predictions of Soviet failure on American defeat,2
The key to understanding the fallacy of thinking that Afghanistan is Russia's Vietnam lies in understanding the traditional political cultures of Vietnam and Afghanistan. The parallels and contrasts that exist between the two invasions both strongly suggest that military force can be successfully used in conjunction with a correct understanding of the local political culture. The Soviets understand the cultural context of Afghanistan better than the Americans understood the culture of Vietnam and because Soviet ı William K. Steven s, "Afghanistan lsn't Quite Russia's Vietnam-or Russia's Afghanistan: vVhose Side is Time on This Time?" The Nevı York Times, October 3, 1982, p. E2.
2 One review of the world's press prior to the British success in the Falklands showed asimilar error in prediction. There was an almost universally pessimistic outlook for the British. See "The \'\forld Looks at the FaIkIands," World Press Review, May 1932, p. 20.
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policy is culturally appropriate to their battıeground there is a good chance that Soviet forces will prevail in Afghanistan.
Neither the invasion of Vietnam nor the invasion of Afghanistanimmediately threatened to destroy the precarious global balance of power. Ultimate Soviet victory in Afghanistan poses such a threat and it is therefore imperative that the United States-and other Westem powers-understand and deal with the danger of a Soviet victory over the mujahedeen.
II.
The United States in Vietnam and the USSR in Afghanistan had four similar motivations for invasion :
(l) Each superpower had long-range ideological motivations;
Each had long-standing geopolitical motivations; (3) Each had immediate politicallideological concerns;
(4) Each perceived that a successful invasion was perınitted by a favorable correlation of forces.
The long-range ideological motivations that halped draw the United States into Vietnam coalesced in the generalization of "Containment" from Europe to the world. Democracy vs communism. it is general wisdom that the French pleas for American support of its colonial war in Indochina would not have drawn the magnanimous levels of material and finance that they did if those pleas had not been couched in the ideological rhetoric of the Cold War. 3 France made the good fight for all of the West (especially [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] against the communist barbarians in Indochina.
SimilarIy the Sov,iet Union perceives that it is hastening the inevitable demise of the capitalist West by helping Marxism-Leninism triumph in Afghanistan. The December 53 1979 invasion is often thought of by Americans as the Soviet perfidity whcih hammered the nails in the coffin of Detente. In the Soviet Union the invasion carried no such significance. Detente, like "Peaceful Coexistence" before it, never denoted the end of the ideological struggle with the West. 4 The support of fraternal parties and national liberation movements is merely a continuation of the ideological struggle-especially valid in areas of the world where there is little risk of a direct physical confrontation with the United States.
The geopolitical motivation of the United States inVietnam grew out of its position as a Pacific power. When it taok the former Mandated islands from Japan during World War II it merely added more territory to the American perimeter in the Far East. The Cold War prompted forward movement of the new perimeter-just as tensions on borders in the past have prompted great powers to advance forward in hope of securing a more defensible line. The British advances throughout India and into Assam and Afghanistan are a classic example of what the United States did-in a different manner-throughout the Far East. 5 The geopolitical impetus reinforced the ideological impetus in a relationship of mutual succor. Indochina was perceived as a front-line staging area for the containment of the Soviet Union and China. The loss of Indochina would force the United States back to a secondary line of defense in the Pacific Islands. 6 The rationale of SEATO was to link NATO with the Far East through CENTO and ring the comrnunist world. All countries in the "ring" were the front line of defense for the West.
The Soviet geopolitical motivations are likewise in mutual succor with their long-range ideological motivations. Much is made of the traditional thrust, continued by the Soviet regime, for a warm water port. it so happens that a Soviet port on the Indian Ocean would mean the liquidation of Pakistan as both an American and a Chinese ally. it would increase the pressure on India and give darker meaning to the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.7 it would increase pressure on Iran and put Soviet naval forces in a commanding strategic position over the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, East Africa, and Turkey.8 The capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union would be a thing of the past and the inevitable triumph of Marxism-Leninism would be far closer.
The immediate political/ideologtcal concems of the United States in Vietnam were formally capsulized in the Domina Theory. If Vietnam fell then so would Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, India, etc. A bad precedent for Containment.
Similarly the Soviet Union capsulizes its own irnmedate concems in the form of the Brezhnev Doctrine.
9 When a state becomes a part of the socialist camp it is entitled to help from the leading socialist state to protect it from reactionary forces of counterrevolution. There is a major contrast in addition to the parallels drawn so far. The Soviet Union wanted to forestall the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism into its Central Asian republics. The United States had no comparable motivation in sending troops to a non-contiguous backwater half-way around the world. A comparable motivation would have existed if a highly popular, hostile ideology had arisen in Mexico and threatened to infect Hispanic Americans in Califomia, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The Soviet Union can be accused of looking at Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as natural geographic and ethnic extensions of its Central Asian republics. But the reverse is also true-and the Soviets are not blind to the possibilities: the view from Tehran or Kabul can be that Soviet Central Asia is a natural extension of non-Soviet Central Asia.
1l Moscow finds it difficult enough to live with Ayatollalı Khomeini. A spirit kindred to Khomeini in Kabul-one who had overthrown a Marxist regime-would be intolerable.
III.
The invasions of Vietnam and Afghanistan occurred because of what Waltz describes as the "simplicity" of relations within the essentially bipolar system that characterizes superpower politics. l2 The correlation of forces is an easier thing to discern when you know exactly who your enemy is. But knowing your enemy does not mean that you are safe from misperceiving your own interests.
There were no major American interests in Vietnam strategic or otherwise. There had once been an economic interest in the form of rubber but the Japanese forced the LI South Vietnam was not a democratic state and therefore could not be a test of Western democracy vs Soviet communism. Therefore the general significance of Vietnam in the global ideological competition between the two superpowers was questionable until it was made a signifcant issue through the American invasion. Today quite a few self-styled "Marxist-Leninist" regimes exist in the Third World and individuaIly the United States attaches little strategic significance tot hem. That is as it should be. Cumulatively there may come a day when the United States finds itself in a hostile world but the popularity of Marxism in the Third World rides on the vehicle of reaction to perceived neocolonialism and is a force fragmented by tribal, national, and ideological schisms. Aside from the reaction of traditional peasants-described below-the American involvement in Vietnam was perceived by Third World elites within and without Vietnam as an attempt to exert dominion not an attempt to preserve the Free World against outside aggression. The more the United States became involved in Vietnam the more Marxism prospered gIobally and IocaIly. The Soviets did not even have to think in expansionist terms. Going into Afghanistan made very good sense in terms of shoring up the shakey status quo of the ir empire. The Afghan government was an endangered Marxist regime on the Soviet border. if the Brezhnev Doctrine did not apply in Afghanistan it might encourage the Poles or someone else to once more test its application to Eastern Europe. In addition a victory for an Islamic jihad over Matxism would be a serious disadvantage to the Soviets in their dealings with their Middle East clients-and also in terms of domestic control in Central Asia where the birth rate of the Moslem population outstrips that of Russian birth and immigration rates.
13
There were no comparable grounds that made good strategic sense for the United States to go into Vietnam-American officials only thought there were. If any war is fight to fight and an objective comparison is made of the invasions of Vietnam and Afghanistan, Vietnam was a "wrong" war and Afghanistan was a "better" decision-although the verdict on Afghanistan is still out.
Vietnam was a failure of the American military as well as being a failure of the politicians.
14 The Americans had overwhelming military superiority over their enemy. They had no supply problems. Yet the military was defeated and that defeat is due to a failure to understand the nature of the war. Military organization and tactics were appropriate to a battlefield in Central Europe not the jungles and guerrilla warfare of Indochina. Morale was terrible and corruption widespread. The "search and destroy mission" was the primary tactic that American forces used on the ground in Vietnam. It was a policy of attrition that momentarHy eleared swaths of territory only to allow that territory to fall back into enemy hands once American troops departed. The tactic did not even serve well the goal of attrition because body counts could not be accurately confirmed. General Westmoreland's lack of tactical imaginatian was so acute that the only alternative that he could pas e to a war of attrition was a war of annihHation. 16
Morale suffered from an attempt to make the boys feel like they were at home whHe they fought the war. The attempt did not make a hitch in Vietnam like playing cowboys and Indians back home the park on aSaturday afternoon. Instead the atempt disoriented the fighting men, contributed to their alienation from Vietnamese, and mu shroomed the army bureaucracy and support staff. In 1968 at the zenith of American troop commitment the United Stated had 543,000 troops in Vietnam but only 80,000 of them-14%-were combat troops!17In 1971the U.S. Army assigned approximately 3,285 soldiers for support activities for every 1,000 men int he field. This American practice compares with the current Soviet practice of assigning 580 support personnel per 1,000 combat personneL. The point is that the 14% of American soldiers who fought the war were demoralized by the large number of their fellow "soIdiers" who sat through the war with soft jobs and who often got rich from dealing on the black market. Base camps were bee hives of officers and enlisted men in staff jobs and service/support activities who were nev er in danger of being sent into combat despite the fact that they were on active duty in a "war zone." The Soviets may have learned from American mistakes. In Afghanistan they appear to be employing their own version of the enclave theory. Their troop levels have not greatly expanded: 85,000 at the time of invasion to an estimated 100,000 today.ıg Approximately. 42.000-42%-are combat troops who are based in heavily fortified garrisons and place the Soviets in strategic control of main urban areas and communication facilities. A mujahedeen commander once boasted to a German journalist that the Soviets "come with weapons as though they had to fight against the United States."20 He and his troops fought back with 80-year old Enfields. homemade weapons, and captured equipment. The image conveyed by the commander's boast was not unlike the image of the United States playing a Central European gameplan in the jungles of Indochina. But the parallel is not entirely correct because the Soviets quickly tried to adapt the use of their equipment and firepower to the stringent requirements of Afghan terrain. Tanks are no longer taken into the mountains but remain in use on the plains where they can be effective. Hind helicopters give the Soviets inereasing mobility in ferrying assault troops and dropping bombs and chemical weapons. There are reports that the Soviets have begun to reorganize their command structure in Afghanistan around the imperatives of the peculiar style of warfare in the country.21
Unlike the United States in Vietnam the Soviets are not hindered by the eonstraints of a free -society. Media reports. individual conseiences, and pluralist domestic politics do not prevent them from employing taetics that would bring domestic wrath down on a Western regime-policies of annihiIation and population relocation. In this respect they take General Westmoreland at his word 19 The statistics are in "Afghanistan: The Americans were always looking for a "light at the end of the tunnel" in Vietnam. A succesful conclusian to the was in Afghanistan in the near future would no doubt please the Kremlin but the current situation is bearable for a much longer term than was true for the United States in Vietnam. As one diplomatic source is reported to have commented, "they apparently think that if they hold onto what they have now time is on their side."24
IV.
Once the troops arrived-both in Afghanistan and Vietnam-their effectiveness was limited by the failure of their 22 Major traditional characteristics that blunted American and Soviet policies are: (ı) A cyclical concept of history, antithetical to one of linear progressian, and inclusive of the idea of the mandate of heaven;
(2) The incidental nature of psychological affinity in sharp contrast to the importance of ritual, ceremony, and economic relationships;
The supremacy of particular loyalities to family, dan, village, or region over loyalty to national politicians and c3ntral governments.
Frances Fitzgerald did the definitive examination of the American misunderstanding of traditional Vietnamese culture. The insights of her analysis in Fire in the Lake are useful for comparison with the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The Americans were tarred and feathered with allies in Vietnam who-demonstrably-reeked of corruption and could not maintain harmony within society. The French had earlier lost the mandate of heaven. First, they lost it to the Japanese and then, in attempting to regain control of Indochina, met disgrace at the hands of those who had taken the mandate from the Japanese, the Vietminh. The Americans, having aided in the ill-fated French. effort and being physically similar to them, were ill suited for easy differentiation from the French-a fact that communist propaganda skillfully exploited. Tactics such as the strategic hamlet program, free-fire zones, and search and destray missions did little to convince the averge Vietnamese that Americans or the clique of French- trained South Vietrtamese off.icers in Saigon could claim the mandate of heaven. General Westmoreland conceived of body counts as measuring progress towards victory in a war of attrition. Vietnamese peasants reacted to the slaughter as evidence that the current historical cycle was in its recurrent phase of revolution. Americans designed pacification programs and elections in part to "progress" Vietna;mese out of the ignorance of their supposed backward society. Vietnamese reacted with repugnance and in revolt-a traditional reaction to overbearing rulers who could neither maintain the observance of custom by others nor obey it themselves. The NLF and North Vietnamese compared favorably with the Americans and Saigon regime because they built a sense of community within the areas that they occupied in which-as in traditional society-everyone had their place. The NLF and North Vietnamese maintained discipline within what they built. Meanwhile the Americans created increasing chaos.
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan af ter the Khalq regimes of Taraki and Amin had so offended traditio,nal harmony that revolt occurred. Prior to the April 1978 coup Prime Minister Daoud led a government that-from time to time-proclaimed reform s that would have thrown the country into chaos had they been implemented. 26 The key to Daoud's ability to maintain a semblance of harmony within traditional Afghanistan was that the proclaimed reforms were only given lip service by his government.
Af ter the 1978 coup the new Khalq regime set about performing a revalutian. After triumphing over the Parcham factian it implemented reforms which, in the autumn of ı978, resulted in revalt in the countryside that grew to be a serious problem. Khalq wanted to push hard to mobilize the countryside behind the new Marxist ideology. Mobilize the countryside Khalq did but hardly in the "progressive" way that leaders in Kabul had envisioned.
The regime perceived itself in the role of ending an exploitative society wherein land-rich leaders and families exploited the masses of rural poor and tenant farmers. This Marxist perception was far from reality. In Afghanistan most people accepted and gaye loyalty to the traditional order.
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Secular and religious leaders in the countrysido had long been successfully preserving harmony in the observance of custom and had presided over land-tenure that resulted in viable agricultural production.
The immediate result of Khalq land reform was a one-third drop in the wheat harvest.
2B
People who knew that their holdings were going to be expropriated did not plant fields that they presumed would be taken from them. Other people were reluctant to accept land from the regime because Islam taught against taking someone else's property. Harmony and custom were further disrupted by the regime's attempts to undercut traditional leaders. In traditional logic the people were justified in resisting uhe Khalq regime and finding leaders who could restore harmony.
The Soviets had warned Khalq about counterrevolutionary reaction to fast-paced reform s and Parcham, on the basis of cadre experience, sided with the Soviets.
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When the Soviets intervened in an attempt to salvage a Marxist regime out of the chaos hat Khalq had created they were unavoidably tarred with the loss of the mandate of heaven. The very fact that their invasion did not end the revolt but instead contributed to wider and more disruptipve chaos only confirmed traditional logic for the average Afghan.
The very concept of winning "hearts and minds" or worrying about ideological purity and social progress is alien to traditional peoples. Outward behavior is significant not the mental processes and emotions within. Elaborate rituals, custom, and economic relationships combine to constrain the unpredictable expression of attitudes and emotion therefore making human behavior predictable and society harmonious. An infidel taken captive by Moslem warriors in the days of Captain John Smith could save the 27 Nancy Peabody NewelI and Richard S. Newell ,.
CONSERV ATlVE ACTlONS
.; 65 rest of his skin merely by agreeing to the removal of his foreskin. Circumcision signified conversion to Islam and that was important-not the feelings of the "former" infidel who may have secretly harbored his old beliefs. In Vietnam the United States attempted to impose on traditional peasants a system of government that was predicated on individual responsibility and attitudes. As Fitzgerald points out the vote was an "instrument of terror"30 for the average Vietnamese. it placed the peasant outside of custom-it was not his place to be running things.
The NLF did not predicate its policies on individual responsibility. Instead it concentrated on giying villagers a place within their group. Communist collectivism was more compatible in Vietnam with traditional individualism than was bourgeois individualism. The traditional indivdual says, "leave me alone n my place;" the bourgeois individual says "respect me for my merit and reasoned opinions."31
In Vietnam even before the Americans arrived traditional Vietnamese society had been corrupted and dislocated by French colonial influence. In Afghanistan the Khalq regime inherited an in ta ct traditional society. In Vietnam the communists built their new society by adapting traditional forms to their own uses. In Afghanistan the communists deliberately put themselves in the role that the French had inadvertantly filled in Vietnam-they set out to destory traditional society.
An important part of the Khalq reform was new family law. The requirement of a marriage license took away the power of heads of families to authorize marriages. The reduction of the bride price from $1000 to$6 created severe economic dislocation within the traditional family.32 The bride price had functioned to compensate the bride's family for the loss of her dowry and for the loss of her work within the family unit. The Khalq reduction of the bride price transformed unmarried women into economic liabi-30 Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, pp. 440-441. 31 C.W., Cassinelli in lectures on the subject at the University of \.yaslıington.
32 Neweıı and Neweıı, The 5truggle for Afghanistan, pp. 82-83.
lities who no longer had incentiye to obey the traditional authority of family heads. Moreover these women were robbed of stability. As economic liabilities they lost their place within family units that owed their cohesiveness to economic roles. In Vietnam the peasants suffered the presence of central government officials with no enthusiasm. Most officials had no roots in the vilIages and saw their positions only as an opportunity to mark time with graft before they could make it back to the city. Even those officials who arrived with some integrity cut through local patterns of traditional authority when they administered Saigon's decrees and by doing so they usurped responsibility: all ilIs could thereafter be laid at their door and, by extension, Saigon's. The interdiction of traditional loyalties had an effect opposite that of consolidating Saigon's hold on the countryside.
In Afghanistan the Khalq regime experienced similar consequences to its policies for consolidating controloutside KabuL. A particularly iHustrative example, deseribed by the Newells,33 is the rebellion of the Nuristani tribe. Prior to 1978 the Nuristanis coexisted with Kabul by means of an arrangement giying the tribe internal autonomy. Nuristani khans regulated and maintained harmony within the tribe's domains and acted as contacts with Kabul's representatives to a greater extent than was true of other tribal leaders within Afghanistan. This arrangement had evolved because of the hostility of the Nuristanis towards the dominant Pushtuns and because their home territory was strategically located on the border with British India Clater Pakistan). In addition to the liasion roles of the khans several Nurist anis were always present in the Afghan officer corps at a senior level. These Nuristani officers provided the government insurance that Nuristani territory would remain loyal and, at the same time, they provided the Nuristanis with the assurance that whatever regime was in Kabul would "rule" the Nuristanis only through the interface of the khans. The Khalq leaders upset the long-adhered to status quo with the Nuristanis. First they executed most of the Nuritan military officers ostensibly because that had supported the Daoud regime. Second they arrested the khans in order to break their leadership and to provide for the direct administration of the Nuristanis from KabuL. When emissaries of direct administration were sent into Nuristani country the Nuristanis treated them !ike the Lakota Soux treated General Custer. By early autumn 1978 the Nuristanis had govemment troops pinned down and had fortified themselves in the rugged mountains of their homeland.
The Khalq attempt to make of the Nuristanis an example backfired disastrously. The govemment only dernonstrated its weakness and facilitated the revolt of other ethnic group s as those other groups came to feel the full bite of Khalq policies. Ethnic group after ethnic group revolted in the Nuristani pattem until, at the end of 1978, all sections of the Afghan population were in revolt against the Marxists.
The foregoing cornparison shows that the policies of the invaders were counterproductive to their goals. The Americans only slowly became aware of the problem of cultural mismesl;ıing and that gradual awareness never permeated throUgh to the main decision makers. The kind of analysis done by Fitzgerald should have been performed at the outset of the American involvement. The various "fact-finding" trips of Secretary of State Robert MacNamara, Vice President Johnson, and others were poor substitutes. The Soviets were more aware from the beginning, as is demonstrated by their wamings to Khalq, of the dangerous reaction that fullspeed reform s were likely to ignite. In the end the choice of invasion was made because of the reaction to Khalq reform s and the Soviets have put thernselves in the position in which the United States put itself in Vietnam. A major contrast exists between the two invasions in that the Soviets appear to have made policy changes to adapt strategy and tactics to the imperatives of terrain and cultural mismeshing.
V.
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The Soviets may have put themselves in alliance with those in Mghanistan who lost the mandate of heaven but that does not mean that Mghanistan has become "Russia's Vietnam" in the sense that they will experience defeat as the United States experience defeat as the United States experienced defeat. Built into the Soviet framework of rationality is their concept of who destroys whom?-the carrelatian of forces. 34 The carrelatian of forces requires Soviet leaders as a matter of "scientific" Marxist analysis to attempt discriminating judgements about the consequences of their policies and to err on the side of being prudent. Contrast the carrelatian of forces with the "can do" attitudes and projections based on faulty statistics that kept American officials loaking for the light at the end of the tunnel in Vietnam.
The concept of the carrelatian of forces is one reason why the Soviet warned Khalq against swiftly implementing reform s and then later sought to single out Hafizullah Amin as a scapegoat for everything that had gone wrong in Afghanistan since the 1978 coup. Unfortunately for the Soviets they were not able to portray themselves as having taken the mandate away from Amin because Amin had long been perceived by the mujahedeen to have last it. The Soviets have not attempted to transport their home society and its trappings to Afghanistan so that the boys can come back from aday fighing the guerrillas to the disorientation of home away from home. They do not have an outrageous percentage of support personnel in ratio to their combat forces committed in Mghanistan. They have learned from the American experience in Vietnam and appear to be making an effort to minimize their visibility in Afghanistan-difficult as that may be given the circumstances of war.
Part of the attempt to minimize Soviet visibility involves the fashioning of a nationalities policy that, in the short Communist party leadership within the indigenous republics usuaIly requires that the First Secretary, a national, be checked by his Russian comrade, the second secretary.36 The First Secretary will have reached that position only af ter education in a Russiarn institution and af ter training in party schools. The form of a national republic with its substance controIled within the USSR py tight administrative control from the Kremlin is a model attractve to Middle Eastern states with the ir own nationality problems. The Soviet administration holds out the promise of keeping the dominant ethnic groups in control whiIe at the same time defusing conflicts over autonomy and eventuaIly welding the entire population into a single "Iraqi" Or "Syrian" nationality.
HistoricaIly the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan has been the Pushtuns. The Pushtuns have c:mtroIled access to public office, made languages official, owned the best grazing lands, ete. Within traditional Afghanistan the tribe is the highest form of poltical 10ya1ty that has any real substance and rivalry between the tribes means a weak 35 Lewis, Rowland, and Clem, Nationality and Population Change, pp. 146-147; "Ethnic Groups: Demography Language," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. xxvi, no. 43, p, lL. By early 1982 the Soviets could not be said to have successfully employed their nationality policy in Afghanistan because success will com e only if it helps them win the war. But one report from Peshawar, Pakistan, concluded that "the Russians are buying themselves relative peace in some areas."38 "Settled" (as opposed to "nomadic" peoples-among who m Kabul now includes refugees) tribes have had their languages made official and their unique cultures ballyhooed. The Afghan Ministry of Tribes now deaI.:; with tribal pathans much like the Nuristani khans used to be dealt with and brotherhood is stressed with national cousins across the border in the Soviet Union. Within the Ministry there is a section, the Akhwan, which has the missionof provoking tribal frictions among peoples inha- 37 For arecent journalist's interview with Soviet Central Asians on their perceptions of Lhe war-whiclı t8nd to bear out the legitimizing power of Soviet nationality policy for current and future operations-see Newsweek, August 9, 1982, p. 36. For a scholar's analysis read Naby, "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations," p. 241. 38 "Accept Us and You Won't Regret It," The Economist, February 27, 1982, p. 54.
biting the border area with Pakistan in order to inhibit guerrilla activities and infiltration from Pakistan.
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Soviet nationality policy is a culturally appropriate strategy for the war in Afghanistan. In contrast to Vietnam, where traditional 8;uthority had been eroded by French influence, patterns of traditional authority are strong in Afghanistan. In fact, traditional leaders, including heads of families, have become guerrilla commanders.
40 Any Soviet policy which accentuates traditional divisions and patterns will help to inhibit the formation of Afghan nationalism and will undercut efforts by mujahedeen leaders in Pakistan and elsewhere to set up an effective central coordinat ing body for the resistance. In contrast to the Americans in Vietnam the Soviets have come to grips with the major military problem of a political war: "how to adapt, quickly and successfully, to the peculiar and unfamiliar battlefield conditions."41 in a war such as the ones in Vietnam '.and Afghanistan the battlefield spans relations with the indigenous society.
A successful Soviet conclusian to the war in Afghanistan will demonstrate to skeptics in the West that military force is still a patent tool for superpower use. Those who have drawn a contrary lesson from the American defeat in Vietnam overlook the fact that the communist victory in Vietnam came through the use of military force. The important point that has been lost sight of is that military force does not exist nar is it used in a vacuum.
VI.
We are fortunate that since World War II the competitian between the United States and the Soviet Union has resulted in a global balance of power. Unfortunately, given the right circumstances, there is no logical reason why there can not alsa result the unwanted byproduct of global imbalance-especially an imbalance short of nuclear war. Such an imbalance could vary in character from the destabilization of several different regions around the globe simultaneously to eventual cultural, economic, and political isolation of the United States. Picture an America whose government had allawed it to falI in the same "encircled" pasition that Stalin perceived the Soviet Union to be in: there would result such political shock that no on8 could be safe in prediciting the catastrophic consequences over a wide variety of spheres. Such catastrophe need not be political science fiction-the possibility is underscored in the foregoing comparison of American and Soviet performances and it is clear that the United States must do a better job of competing with the Soviet Union. A failura to compete adequately will generate global imbalance; in a word, catastrophe.
Global imbalance will threaten the preservation of our independence and our systems of values throughout the West. it is within our systems that we can argue that war is immoral and striye to get those who have other value systems to agree with us. Ironically we have a tendeney in the West to liberally accord the benefit of the doubt even to those who, such as Lenin or Hitler, explicitly repeat that their intention is to destroy us. When our value systems are tak en over by such dedicated people they no longer net d the benefit of the doubt previously accorded to them and we can no longer argue with them. We have not reached that point with the Soviet Union but the danger looms. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not immediately threaten the global power balance but if the Soviets emerge victorious there-in a a victory any way comparable to their victory of the 1920's in Central Asia-global imbaIance is more probable that improbable.
if the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan the significance of their victory will not be confined to the fact that, unlike the United States in Vietnam, they were abi e to employ enough brute force and to design their policies to blandish the sensibiIities of a traditional people. The significance will be in terms of the world's perceptions of the relative power of the United States and the Soviet Union-including policy makers in Washington and Moscow.
A world-wide perception that the Soviet Union can do what the United States cannot will be a systems-wide characteristic of the international environment. Such a perception will have an effect on the distribution of power capabilities across the international system and weight the balance more heavily in favor of the Soviet Union than it is now alleged to be by some of the alarmists in our midst. Actua! military power ratios will have little to do with such an effect-it is the intangible component of psychological ratios-perceptions-that will be cruciaL.
The United States should not wait to see what lesso11 the world is going to draw from a Soviet victory in Afghanistan. it should do its best to make the Soviet involvement there as costly as possible by seeing to it that the mujahedeen get all the supplies that they ne ed to sustain their resistance and aLLthe outside publicity and political access that they ne ed to wage a successful propaganda war in media organ s and the United Nations.
The longer the Soviets wallow in Afghanistan the greater will be their costs both internally and externally. If they withdraw they will not leave behind a vacuum filled by American troops but if they win they will have com o mu ch closer to their long term goal of dominating the international system. lt does not threaten the stability of the world to exact costs from the Soviets in Afghanistanquite the reverse. But it is vital that we sustain the muia.hedeen in their own fight for their own way of life. if Western policy makers assume that the mujahedeen are fightig for liberal Wester values any "heıp" extended tn the mujahedeen may very well end up being counterpro. ductive. it is their fight but it is within our interests to buttress it.
